Worker turnover at the firm level and crowding out of lower educated workers by Berg, G.J. van den et al.
Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometric
Serie research memoranda
Norker turnover at the firm level and crowding out of lower educated workers
Gerard  J. van den Berg
‘ieter  A. Cautier
an C. van Ours
Ieert Ridder
tesearch  Memorandum 1998-49 October 1998
applied
labour
economics
research
team
vrije  Universiteit amsterdam
Worker turnover at the firm level and
crowding out of lower educated workers*
Gerard J. van den Berg t
Pieter A. Gautier $
Jan C. van Ours 5
Geert Ridder 7
October 5, 1998
Abstract
In The Netherlands, as in many countries: unemployment rates of lower
educated workers are higher and more cyclical than unemployment rates
of higher educated workers. In this paper we test whether this is caused
by the fact that more highly educated individuals occupy simple jobs in
cyclical downturns. We use a unique firm-worker dataset  to investigate
this hypothesis. In addition, we examine to what extent workers with more
years of schooling earn higher wages than their less educated colleagues at
the same job level in the same firm. We find that at one of the lower job
complexity levels, the difference between schooling of the inflow and the
outflow increases in cyclical downturns. At the same time, workers with
surplus schooling earn somewhat lower wages at this job level. For the
other job complexity levels we find no evidence for crowding out.
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1 Introduction
Most European labor markets are characterized by both relatively high and rel-
atively cyclical unemployment rates for lower educated workers. In recent lit-
erature: most attention has gone out to explain the relatively high stock of low
skilled unemployment, see e.g. Layard et al. (1991),  OECD (1996),  Nickel1 and
Bell (1996). T here are four main explanations for this fact. First, skill biased tech-
nological change in an imperfect labor market can lead to a fall in the demand for
lower educated workers. Second, increased competition and international trade
leads to a change in the industrial structure. Third, wage floors like for example
the minimum wage reduce labor demand for unskilled workers. Besides those
three explanations which focus on the demand side, there is a fourth explanation
which focuses on the supply side of the labor market. According to this explana-
tion, unskilled workers have higher replacement rates when unemployed and thus
they have less incentives to work.
The fact that the unemployment rate of lower educated workers increases
relatively strongly in cyclical downturns (for evidence see e.g. Van Ours and
Ridder, 1995)IS generally explained by the fact that firms typically invest more
in job specific capital for highly educated workers. The highly educated workers
will therefore be hoarded during recessions and the lower educated workers will
be laid off. See e.g. Oi (1968) and Hamermesh (1993).l
In addition to the explanations just mentioned there is the less familiar ex-
planation of “crowding out”of  lower educated workers by workers with a higher
education. This explanation has been rather popular in the Netherlands (see e.g.
Asselberghs et al. (1997) and Teulings and Koopmanschap (1989) and has been
used to explain both the high unemployment rates for lower educated workers
(documented in Table 1) and the fact that low skilled unemployment is more
cyclical.
One of the first models of job competition and crowding out was developed
by Thurow (1975). In this model, the labor market is not a market of matching
demand and supply for various job skills but one of matching trainable individ-
uals with training ladders. Moreover, the marginal product is associated with
jobs rather than with workers. In this view, the labor market is a closed system.
When there is a fixed amount of jobs with fixed characteristics (including wages)
and an excess supply of labor, it is likely that higher educated (and cheaper
trainable) workers who cannot find a job will accept jobs below their level at
the cost of workers with intermediate skills, who will in turn accept simple jobs.
Finally, at the end of the line there are the lowest educated workers who become
unemployed. The problem with this explanation is that the composition of va-
lPfann  and Palm (1990) give evidence that adjustment costs are much higher for white
collar workers. Also note that when workers who become unemployed loose skills, there will be
persistence in the level of low skilled unemployment and the distinction between cyclical and
structural unemployment vanishes.
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cancies  does not adjust at all to the composition of the labor market. Moreover,
both employers and workers who are employed below their job level can improve
their position by forming better matches and it is therefore hard to believe that
crowding out is a long lasting structural phenomenon. If one looks at cross coun-
try comparisons, the evidence also strongly suggests that countries with a highly
educated labor force have relatively more complex jobs than countries with a
relatively lower educated labor force. Similarly, we see that over a longer time
span, both the fraction of simple jobs and the fraction of workers with a lower
education has fallen. This suggests that in the long run, the composition of jobs
and workers move in the same direction. There is also a fundamental measure-
ment problem associated with structural crowding out since we never observe
worker skills and job requirements exactly. It is therefore virtually impossible to
correctly label someone to be overqualified for a particular job. One basically has
to make the extreme assumption that the econometrician observes more than the
individual firm and worker who have decided to form a match. Moreover, the
job requirement is often not fully determined before the formation of a match.
Hence, we cannot conclude from the simple fact that some workers with a higher
education occupy simple jobs that crowding out takes place. It is therefore likely
that crowding out, if present, is a cyclical phenomenon.2
An early model that allows for cyclical crowding out is the one by Okun (1981)
who has suggested that in bad times it is costly to adjust wages and that firms will
therefore increase their hiring standards instead. A different reason for cyclical
crowding out is given by standard job search theory. When it takes time for
workers and vacancies to find each other, a possible strategy for higher educated
workers is to temporary accept a simple job and to continue searching for a more
complex job which pays a higher wage. There are however also reasons to believe
that cyclical crowding out is an unlikely outcome. McCormick (1990) shows for
example that skilled workers may be reluctant to accept unskilled jobs even on a
temporary basis because of fear of stigmatization. Therefore, unemployed higher
educated workers tend to invest in job search, rather than take an interim position
at an unskilled job.
The empirical evidence on the existence of cyclical crowding out is mixed.
The general approach that has been followed is to relate a measure of labor mar-
ket tension to the education-job level distribution. Teulings and Koopmanschap
(1989) use regional differences in unemployment rates as a measure for labor
market tension. They found that the relative change in the employment share
of workers with a lower education at occupations for which, in general, only a
lower education is required is lower in regions with high unemployment, and they
therefore conclude that there is crowding out. A problem with this approach is
2Hecker  (1992) has argued that from 1970 onwards, an increasing number of US college
students were employed at “high school jobs”. This paper got a lot of attention in the popular
press. Tyler et al. (1995) hs owed however that during the 80’s,  the fraction of young college
graduates at “high school jobs” declined and that their real earnings increased.
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that the analysis focuses on occupations rather than job levels. It can therefore
not be ruled out that the results are driven by differences in adjustment  costs
between workers with different education levels at the same occupations. More-
over, workers can move freely between regions. Van Ours and Ridder (1995) use
V/U  ratios of different labor market segments to test for cyclical crowding out. A
necessary condition for crowding out in their model is that an unemployed worker
is better of searching at lower level jobs. The approach of Van Ours and Ridder
focuses at the supply side of the labor market. The idea is that crowding out
takes place when the ratio of unemployed job seekers to vacancies in a particular
segment exceeds the ratio of unemployed job seekers to vacancies in the lower
neighboring segment. Only then, it becomes optimal to supply labor below one’s
level. Except for workers with an academic degree they find no evidence that the
V/U  ratio’s are higher at lower labor market segments and they conclude that
the disproportionately high unemployment rates for lower educated workers must
be due to the higher firing rate that this group faces.
Van Ours and Ridder find that supply orientated cyclical crowding out is
largely irrelevant. We focus on demand orientated (cyclical) crowding out. Our
data allow us to directly test at the firm level whether the quality of the workforce
increases during periods of high unemployment. The data we use are unique in the
sense that they contain informat,ion  on both worker, job and firm characteristics.
Other advantages of our data are that they are based on administrative records,
that the key variables for crowding out (education and job complexity level) are
measured independently and that we observe both new and separating workers.
If cyclical crowding out is important, firms require more schooling at given job
complexity levels during bad Gmes.  We will therefore test whether the difference
in years of schooling between the inflow and outflow of workers for a given job
level in a particular firm, is larger during low employment years. Unlike some of
the previous studies, which restricted crowding out to be an inflow phenomenon
only, we will allow crowding out to be the result of a combination of inflow and
outflow policies at the firm level. Moreover, we can directly observe whether
upgrading is the result of the outflow of workers with a relatively lower education
or whether it is caused by the inflow of workers with a relatively higher education,
at given job levels.
An additional advantage of our data is that we have information on gross
hourly wage data to distinguish between substitution and pure crowding out
and that we can test whether the returns to schooling are still positive when we
condition on job complexity levels. Our findings suggest that the wage differential
between new workers who have followed relatively many years of schooling and
their direct colleagues (in the same firm at the same job level) is almost zero.
The discussion on crowding out has also entered the policy arena. From a wel-
fare point of view, crowding out can never be a first best solution since potential
productivity is not used. It is therefore often argued that policy makers should
stimulate job creation at the top segment of the labor market when crowding out
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exists (see e.g. Asselberghs et al. (1998)). This is sometimes called a “choking
chimney” policy. If on the other hand, the high and cyclical unemployment rates
for workers with a lower education are caused by any of the explanations men-
tioned at the beginning of this paper, policy makers could better directly focus
at the bottom segment of the labor market. Another conventional wisdom is that
when there is crowding out, there is no need for extra education of low skilled
workers since those workers would occupy simple jobs anyway.3  This view is also
typically based on a static and mechanical view of the labor market. If crowding
out is for example the result of search frictions, better schooling will lead to the
opening of more complex job vacancies and will lower overall unemployment.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the data we use
for testing the empirical relevance of crowding out and present some descriptive
statistics. In section 3 we test to what extent employers exploit recessions to
improve the average skill level of their work force at given job complexity levels.
Finally in section 4, we investigate whether workers with relatively many years
of education at a given job level earn higher wages than their direct colleagues
at the same job level in the same firm.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Data
For this paper we have used the AVO data set of the Department of Social Affairs
and Employment which covers the period 1992-96. The data were originally
collected to obtain information on the development of wage income for different
categories of workers and are based on administrative records of firms by means
of a stratified two step sampling procedure. In the first step a sample of firms is
drawn from the Department’s own firm register (which is roughly similar to the
firm register of Statistics Netherlands). 4 In the second step a sample of workers
is drawn within each of these firms.
At the first stage, a sample of firms was selected using a stratified (by industry
and firm size) design. The number of strata changed between surveys. In 1993,
the sample that we use consists of 1682 firms which were drawn from 80 strata,
in 1994, the sample consists of 1563 firms from 280 strata, in 1995, the sample
3The following remarks from the popular press reflect this popular view. Robert Samuelson
wrote in a Newsweek column of August 1992: ” ./If] more people had gone to college in the
1980’s they would have competed mostly for lower-wage jobs that usually don’t require a degree”.
In the same year, Sylvia Nasar wrote an article with the suggestive title “More College graduates
taking low-wage jobs” in the New York Times.
4Firms  from the service sector and other semi-public sectors were included in all samples.
Since the 1993 sample contained no information on public sector workers, we excluded this
sector from the other samples as well.
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contains 1375 firms from 312 strata, and in 1996 there are I548  firms from 328
strata. Particularly firms with less than 10 employees are under-represented.
At the second stage, a sample of workers was drawn from the firms which
were selected in the first step. This was done as follows. Prom small firms
(<20  employees) the entire work force was sampled whereas for larger firms, the
fraction of workers who were sampled decreases with firm size. Then, in October
of year t,  an aselect  sample of workers from the wage administration of each
firm was drawn and in addition information was obtained on the total outflow
of workers within each firm. From the workers sampled at October of year t
additional information on hours worked and wage earnings was obtained from
the wage administration of October ( t  -  1). Moreover, to obtain information
on separating workers, a number of workers (consistent with the total outflow
rate of the firm) who were present in October of year t -  1 and who were not
present at October of year t were drawn in addition. After this aselect  sample of
workers was drawn, it was checked whether minimally 10 workers had a collective
wage agreement and 10 workers had no collective wage agreement and whether
there were minimally 8 stayers, 8 new workers and 8 separating workers in the
sample. If this was not the case, the worker sample was extended to obtain those
minimum levels, except of course for those firms which employed, for example,
less than 10 workers with a collective wage agreement or which hired less than
8 new workers. On average, more than 75% of the workers were present at both
sample moments. When workers were only present at October t-l and not at
October t (outflow): information was obtained on the new labor market state of
the worker.5
Thus, the sampling probability for an individual worker depends on the prob-
ability that the firm is sampled and the probability that the worker is sampled
within the firm, which in turn depends on the size of the firm. It depends indi-
rectly (when less than a minimum level of a certain worker type was sampled) on
the type of wage contract, whether the worker is a new entrant, a stayer or has
left in the previous period. For each observation a weight (equal to the inverse
of the sampling probability) was constructed. In addition, separate jkm weights
were constructed which are equal to the inverse of the sampling probability of the
firm. When the unit of observation in our analysis is the firm, we use firm level
weights while when the unit of observation is the individual, we use firm*worker
weights to obtain population quantities. As mentioned before, only for some vari-
ables (wages, hours worked), information is available for both year t and t - 1
but for the variable which measures the job complexity level this information is
not available. Thus we have for example no information on promotions within
firms between year t and t - 1. In addition, we miss the workers who were hired
after October t -  1 and who left before October t - 1. We have information
5The  in- and outflow rates appear to be consistent with figures from other data sources (the
Dutch Social Security Council), see Gautier (1997).
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on gross wages (also on over time payments and profit shares), hours worked,
days worked, education, job complexity level, occupation, age, tenure, gender,
and type of wage contract. For a detailed description of the job complexity and
education levels we refer to the appendix and to Venema (1996),  Wiggers (1998),
and Gautier (1998) in which the AVO data are compared with other sources.
The advantages of the AVO data are that we observe both worker and firm
characteristics, and that it is based on administrative records so that we have
very few missing observations. Moreover, the data contain detailed information
on the in- and outflow of workers. Finally, education and job complexity, the key
variables for crowding out are measured independently.
There is also a number of limitations. Due to the complex sample design
and the many strata, some (firm) weights become extremely large. It turns
out that this seriously influences certain key variables and leads to differences
of the variables in our sample and the Dutch labor force survey (EBB), col-
lected by statistics Netherlands. We therefore chose to remove the records with
(worker*firm)  weights larger than 500 from the sample (about 5% for each year).
Those were mainly workers employed at small firms in small sectors. We have
checked whether the new sample is more representative for the entire working
population by comparing the distributions of a number of key variables over time
and with the Labor Force Survey of the Central Bureau of Statistics and this
seemed to be the case (although the weighted fraction of small firms in our sam-
ple is still larger in 1993 than in the other years6  Another disadvantage of this
data set is that it does not contain any information on value added, output,
profits, capital and investment.The main reason for this is that the data were
designed to study wage growth and therefore only information from the wage
administration of firms was obtained. Table 2 shows some characteristics of the
AVO data. We see that most of the means of variables like age, gender and
education, are quite stable over time. Also note that relatively more small firms
and more workers with a (semi) collective wage agreement were present in the
1993 sample. In our formal tests of section 4 we will therefore have to control for
those variables. The behavior of the education and job complexity distributions
will be discussed at more length in the next section.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
First, we will show that 1993 and to a lesser extent 1994 can be considered
to be bad years in terms of employment opportunities. The strong recovery
of employment in the Netherlands started in 1995 and continued in the years
thereafter. Table 5 shows that in 1993 unemployment increased strongly while
few vacancies were created. In 1995 and 1996 unemployment fell and many
vacancies were created. Moreover, the U/U  ratios for almost all education groups,
61n  our analysis in the next section we will however control for firm size
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and in particular for those with only elementary school were lower in 1993 than
in 1995 and 1996. This cyclical pattern is also present in the AVO data. From
table 2, we see that the difference between the inflow and the outflow rates was
substantially higher in 1995 and 1996 than in 1993 and 1994. In addition, the
fraction of workers employed at shrinking firms was higher while the fraction of
workers employed at growing firms was lower in 1993 and 1994 than in 1995 and
1996.
In Tables 3 and 4, we give information on the skill and education structure
of jobs and workers based on four AVO surveys (92-93, 93-94, 9495 and 95-
96). The samples of period t contain information on employment in period t and
t -  1. Since job complexity is only measured once, the differences in fractions of
workers employed at a particular job complexity level between period t and t - 1
in one sample can only be due to differences in the magnitude and composition
of the inflow and outflow of workers. Thus, the differences in the education job
complexity distribution across samples can be partly explained by the fact that
we miss promotions within firms. We can however not rule out that some of the
differences are due to sampling errors. Most of the empirical analysis of the next
section will therefore be carried out for separate job complexity levels. We see
from Table 3 (date t, survey t) that in 1993, 18.5% of all employed workers was
reported to be employed at a simple job, in 1994 this was 21.3% while in 1995 this
was 19.3% and in 1996, it was only 14.4%. At the same time we see from table
4 that in 1993, 60.9% had a lower education, in 1994, this fraction was 61.8%,
in 1995 it was 58.4% and in 1996 it was 54.9%. The fractions of workers with
primary school only for 1993-96 are respectively: 7.4%,  6.8%,  7.9% and 6.0%.
Thus the 1996 sample contains a smaller faction of simple jobs and relatively
fewer workers with a lower education than the other samples.
To get some ideas about the empirical relevance of crowding out in the mid 90’s
we will first’ test whether a larger fraction of simple jobs was occupied by higher
educated workers in the low employment year 1993. The results of our simple
test on the existence of crowding out are shown in Table 7 which indicates that
relatively fewer workers with an intermediate and higher education were employed
at a simple job (level fl/f2)  in the low employment years 1993 and 1994 than
in 1995 and 1996.7  In 1993, 6.9% of the workers at simple jobs had followed an
intermediate or higher education and in 1994 this fraction was 7.3% while in 1995
and 1996, respectively 8.2% and 9.9% of the workers at simple jobs had completed
at least an intermediate education. Thus in the high employment years, the
average education level at simple jobs seems to be somewhat higher. Under
crowding out, we would expect the opposite. The data also give information
on the destination of exiting workers. Table 8 shows that workers with a lower
education and workers employed at simple jobs have higher layoff rates than
workers with a higher education and workers employed at complex jobs. This is
7Tables  18 -21 give a more extensive view on the distribution of workers over jobs.
8
consistent with the labor hoarding story we discussed at the beginning of this
paper. The layoff rates are much higher for all worker and job types in the low
employment year 1993. We also see that in the high employment years 1995 and
1996, the highly educated workers move more often to a new job while in the
low employment years, the workers with a lower education move more often to a
new job. It is likely that those decisions are based on different motivations. The
lower educated workers who anticipate a layoff or dismissal during a downturn
are likely to increase their search intensity while on the other hand, booms are
typically periods when the rewards to search are much higher for workers with a
higher education. As job search theory predicts, most job to job movements are
from workers employed at simple jobs. It is more likely to find a better position
when one is employed at the bottom of the job ladder than at the top.
The descriptive statistics in this section show that recessions are not periods
in which more highly educated workers occupy simple jobs. We do find evidence
that lay off rates for workers with a lower education are higher than for workers
with a higher education. In the next section we will test whether there is evidence
for crowding out at the firm level.
3 A test on cyclical crowding out
In this section we directly test the hiring and firing policy of firms with respect
to the education requirements of their work force. As mentioned before, the
hypothesis we test is very much related to Okun’s (1984) idea that employers are
often reluctant to lower wages during bad times and instead increase education
standards for given jobs.
Unlike previous studies, which have been based on aggregate data, our data
allow us to directly test to what extent employers increase their education stan-
dards in periods of increasing unemployment. In the next section we explicitly
define a variable which measures the difference between average education re-
quirements for the inflow and for the outflow at a given job complexity level in
a given firm. We test whether this variable is larger during bad times. In the
remaining of this section, we say more on the educational requirements over the
cycle for inflow  and outflow separately and in addition we test for selectivity bias.
3.1 Do firms upgrade their work force in bad times?
In this section we perform a direct test of the hypothesis that firms increase the
educational level of their work force during bad times. Since the sort of activities
within a particular job complexity level can change over the cycle we have to
define a job at the lowest possible aggregation level. Below we explain how we
measure upgrading.
Let ~2  be the average number of years of education for the inflow into
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job complexity level k at firm j and let yJ$  be the average number of years of
education for the o’zltj?ow  from job complexity level k at firm  j.  8 We will assume
that the amount of required schooling for both inflow and outflow at each job
complexity level depends on observable firm characteristics, job specific effects
and macro-economic conditions, which are captured by calendar time dummies.
95 K
where CX$  and o$are  fixed job effects, ,@and  ,f?pt are coefficient estimates of
the firm effects, xjt  is a vector with firm characteristics in year t,  72  and ygrt  are
coefficient estimates of the calendar time effects, dkt  is a dummy which is equal
to 1 for job complexity level k and year t and zero otherwise and ~3  and ~7:~  are
i.i.d. error terms.
If firms increase education standards for certain jobs, we expect that in 1993,
in which unemployment grew strongly, the difference between the years of educa-
tion for the inflow and the outflow at given job complexity levels, will be higher
than in the high employment years 1995 and 1996. Thus the effect of dkgs  on
( $2 -  y;tt)  gives us information on potential upgrading of firms. Before we can
estimate those effects, we will assume that the firm effects have the same value
in both the inflow and the outflow equations but we will allow the job effects to
differ, hence CL$  -  o$  = ok.  Thus we estimate
95 K
(Yji  - Y;rt)  = Qi  + Pkxjt+  C C  Yktdkt + &jk
t=93k=l
(3)
The results can be found in table 9. For most job complexity levels, the effect
of dkg3 on (yz  -  ?J$‘~)  is zero or even negative (relative to dkgs).  Only for job
complexity level 2 it is significantly positive with a coefficient estimate of 0.31 (s.e.
is 0.15).’  We also see that during our sample periods, the mean of ( y$  -  yJyt)  was
positive for all job complexity levels and that most of the upgrading took place
at intermediate job complexity levels. It is still interesting to see how the inflow
and outflow equations behave separately and whether turnover is higher under
8We  excluded retirements from the outflow because the older cohort has in general followed
a relatively lower education and occupies relatively complex jobs. Including this cohort did
however not lead to any changes of our conclusions.
‘We  could not reject the joint hypothesis that the coefficient estimates of the 1993 dummies
are zero in all equations (F[5,4319]=1.13).  Moreover, we experimented with a recession dummy
which takes the value 1 in 1993 and 1994 and zero otherwise. For none of the job complexity
levels we found a sign&cant effect of the recession dummy. We also could not reject the
hypothesis that the recession dummy was zero in all equations, F[5,4341]=0.87.
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low skilled workers. This will be the subject of the next section. In addition we
will check to what extent our results are disturbed by selectivity bias.
3.2 Sensitivity analyses and the quality of new and sepa-
rating workers over the cycle
To get an idea on potential sample selection effects, we will check whether the
fact that both in and outflow are observed has a significant effect on the calen-
dar time dummies for the inflow and outflow equations. Those equations also
give information on the cyclical behavior of the education requirements for new
workers and whether recessions are periods in which mainly workers with a lower
education separate from a given job. Thus consider the following equations:
Where n$ and nJ$” take the value 1 when respectively inflow and outflow are
observed and zero otherwise. An F-test on the joint significance of ~$2 and cfi
and of c$J~“” and sky2 will tell us something about different behavior of the firms
for which we observe both in- and outflow simultaneously. Tables 10 and 11 show
that for job complexity levels 1,3  and 4 we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
@c and <g are zero. Including c#$‘h~~t  and tkytdktn$  in the inflow equation leads
to a somewhat smaller effect of the 1993 dummy. For the outflow equation, we
have to reject the null hypothesis that @z and <tdkt  are zero for job complexity
levels 3 and 6-8. Those tables also learn us that in 1993, the average education
of both in- and outflow was close to zero or negative (relative to 1996). The
estimates for all job levels together even show a significantly negative effect for
both the education of the in- and outflow in the low employment years. In the
appendix we compare the hiring and firing behavior of firms over a number of sub
samples to learn more about selectivity and in addition we reestimate  equations
1 and 2 with the two-stage Heckman  (1979) method. Tables 16 and 17 show that
the coefficient estimates of the selectivity terms are insignificant for alI  job levels
of the outflow equations (except for the one based on the entire sample) and
significantly positive for job complexity levels 1 and 3. The coefficient estimates
of the 1993 dummy are however almost equal to the ones in Tables 10 and 11.
To sum up, we cannot rule out that some of our estimates of the previous
section are biased because of sample selection. The separate estimates for in-
and outflow do show that in the low employment year 1993, the average educa-
tion of the inflow did not increase (for all job levels together it even decreased
significantly) but that the average education level of the outflow level did in gen-
eral strongly decrease. This suggests that if any form of upgrading takes place
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in periods of high unemployment, this is the result of outflow of workers with a
relatively low education.
4 Do higher educated workers earn more at sim-
ple jobs than lower educated workers?
Next, we test whether the wage earnings of workers who have followed relatively
many years of schooling at a given job complexity level are higher or lower than
the wages of other workers at. the same job complexity level within the same
firm. In other words, we test whether, conditioning on job complexity levels, the
returns to schooling are still positive. If this is the case, it is likely that the workers
with more schooling are also more productive on those jobs. When workers with
relatively many years of schooling at their job level earn less than the other
workers this could be caused by a number of things. Firstly, it can reflect a wage
penalty which the workers with surplus schooling have to pay because of their
larger quit probability. This is consistent with equilibrium search models of the
Pissarides (1990) type. When a worker with a higher education would temporarily
accept a job below his level and would continue searching for a better job he needs
to produce sufficiently more on this job than the workers with a lower education
to compensate the employers for the smaller match surplus (caused by his larger
quit probability). Alternatively it could reflect a lower productivity of the workers
with surplus schooling. It is for example possible that highly educated workers
are less productive on simple repeating activities than lower educated workers.
Finally, observed negative returns to schooling at given job levels can be the result
of unobserved characteristics of those workers, for which we cannot control, like
for example type of study and social skills. In the literature, workers who have
more education than required for a certain occupation are sometimes labeled to
be overschooled . We prefer to avoid this term because, although it is possible
to measure required schooling, it is very hard to determine whether someone is
overschooled or not. This is due to the fact that the productivity of a job depends
on both worker, firm and match characteristics. Instead, we will define a new
variable, ~z*jk, for every worker and job pair, which equals: (wijk-  iT+)  where
wijk is the log of the hourly wage of worker i at firm  j at job complexity level
Ic  and Wjkis  the log of the average hourly wage at job complexity level k in firm
j.  Thus we compare the wage of each worker with the average wage at the same
job complexity level in the same firm the worker is employed at. This enables
us to check whether higher educated workers are more productive on simple jobs
and whether the returns to schooling at a given job complexity level change over
the business cycle. Since we want to allow required schooling at a given job
complexity to vary across firms, we will define the variable szjk = (edijk-  eajk),
where edijk  is the amount of schooling (in years) of worker i at firm j at job
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level k and e&l: is the average amount of education at job level k in firm j. We
can now regress Zz’jk  on various firm and worker characteristics , on  and on
calendar time.
95 K
Zz;k  = Plkxijk  + &kS,fjk  x  x  Ykdkt  f Vijk
t=93k=l
where xijk contains both firm and worker characteristics. We have restricted our
analysis to the inflow of new workers at period t because only then we are sure to
capture the firm’s wage policy during period t and we don’t have to bother about
the endogeneity of tenure. lo Also note that we now use the individual as unit
of observation and that we have to weight accordingly.” When the process of
upgrading the work force actually leads to a higher productivity, it is more appro-
priate to talk about substitution than about crowding out. Under substitution,
we expect that at a given job complexity level, workers with a higher education
earn higher wages. From Table 12 we see that new workers with relatively many
years of schooling earned almost the same as the other workers at simple jobs,
although the coefficient for job complexity level 2 is significantly negative and
for job complexity level 3 it is significantly positive. This result might be puz-
zling to those who are familiar with the literature on “overschooling”. Duncan
and Hoffman (1981),  Rumberger (1987),  Hersch  (1991),  Hartog and Oosterbeek
(1985) and other studies surveyed in Hartog (1998) all found that the rewards
to surplus schooling are positive. None of those studies corrected however for
fixed firm effects. To get a better idea of the differences between our results and
those found in the literature on overschooling, we have repeated our estimates
without correcting for hxed  firm effects ( the coefficient estimates with s.e.‘s of
the schooling variable are presented in the last two rows of Table 12). Except for
job level 1, the coefficient estimates for the effects of schooling on gross hourly
wages turn out to be highly significant in this case. This suggests that workers
with relatively many years of schooling (given their jobs) tend to select them-
selves into high wage firms and that the results of the “overschooling” literature
are mainly driven by selectivity effects.r2  Our findings suggest that the workers
with relatively many years of schooling compared to their direct colleagues use
their education as a compensation for a lack of other skills.
Furthermore, we see that at f3-f5,  females earn significantly less than males
even if we control for job levels. Not included in the table are the effects of
shrinking and growing firms. Only for f5 we found a significant negative effect
of the “growing firm” dummy on ,z,;~, although the value was small (0.05, s.e.
“This is also the reason why for each job complexity level the mean of Zijk  is negative.
r’WLS was necessary because more than 300 strata were used in the sample and we therefore
could not include all cross products of firm and size classes on the right hand side of the
equationsweighted and unweighted regressions gave however very similar results.
“See  Hartog (1998) for a discussion of other measurement problems related to overschooling.
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0.02). Also not included are the effects of a collective wage agreement which was
only significantly positive for f3 (0.02, se: 0.01).
5 Conclusion
Cyclical crowding out is the process where lower educated workers at simple jobs
are replaced by higher educated workers in periods when jobs are relatively scarce.
Crowding out as explanation for the high and cyclical unemployment rate of lower
educated workers has become increasingly popular in the Netherlands. There are
however many other possible reasons for those facts. Therefore, if we really want
to take crowding out serious, it has to be supported by the data. Our results
suggest that in periods of low employment, less workers with an intermediate or
higher education are employed at simple jobs, which is inconsistent with crowding
out. In addition, we find that for all job types, the average education went up in
the first half of the nineties. For intermediate jobs, the average difference between
years of schooling of the in- and outflow of workers is highest.
Only for one of the lower job complexity levels we find evidence that firms
upgraded their work force in the low employment year 1993. For the other 5 job
complexity levels we find no evidence for upgrading during recession years. We
also find no evidence t,hat  the average education of the inflow increased during
recession but we did find strong evidence that, in particular during low employ-
ment periods, workers with relatively few years of completed education separate
more frequently than higher educated workers.
New workers with a relatively high education earn about the same as their
colleagues at the same job level at the same firm in the same year. For job com-
plexity level 3 (which contains by far the most workers), we find that workers
with relatively many years of schooling earn slightly (but statistically significant)
more than their direct colleagues at the same job level in the same firm while
at job complexity level 2> workers with relatively many years of schooling earn
slightly less (but statistically significant) than their direct colleagues. The gen-
eral evidence is thus that workers with relatively many years of schooling at given
job complexity levels are not more productive at those jobs than their direct col-
leagues. The difference between our results and the results in the literature on
“surplus schooling” is driven by the fact that we take account of firm specific
effects. It turns out that workers with relatively many years of schooling (com-
pared to other workers at the same job level) select themselves into high wage
firms.
We also conclude that the evidence for crowding out is very thin. As far as it
takes place, it is more outflow driven than inflow driven. If crowding out would
have been an important reason for the high unemployment rate of lower educated
workers, policy makers should stimulate job creation at the top segments of the
labor market to encourage higher educated workers to leave simple jobs. Our
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results suggest however that it is more likely that lower educated workers become
unemployed because their jobs are not productive enough any more. Policies to
reduce unemployment of lower educated workers should therefore focus directly
on the lower segment of the labor market. One can think of decreasing the cost
of creating lower educated jobs by means of tax incentives, stimulate the training
of lower educated workers, or allow firms to temporary lower their wages in bad
times.
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Appendices
A Sensitivity analyses
The estimates of Table 9 potentially suffer  from selectivity bias since we observe
( 9;;  -  yz”)  only for a limited amount of firms. To get an idea of the importance
of this problem we will take two approaches. First, we will compare the hiring
and firing behavior of a number of sub samples with each other to check to what
extent the firms for which we observe simultaneous in and outflow at a given job
complexity level behave differently from firms at which we observe only inflow or
only outflow at given job complexity levels. Secondly, we reestimated equations 1
and 2 using the two-stage sample selection bias correction approach of Heckman
(1979).
The variables n%  and ny;;it take the value 1 when respectively inflow and
outflow are observed and zero otherwise. Let the equations that determine the
sample selection be:
95 K
(7)
95 K
(8)
Since the sampling rule is that ( y$  -  y$)  is observed when both n$  and n$
> 0 we get an unbiased estimator for E(  y$  -  y$lxjt,  ng > 0 n$  > 0) when
($--  E$~)  I (n$,  ngEt)  . In that case we can estimate the effect of (7G3 - Yi%)
on the conditional mean of ($ - y;r’)  by WLS. To test this, we will compare
the coefficient estimates of yiz3 and yE$,  (for the low employment year 1993)
based on different subsets of our sample, with each other. Consider the following
equations (in terms of conditional expectations).
a E(y$ - yJ$tlxjt,nz > O,nzt  > 0)
b E(y$/xjt,n$  > 0)
c E(y$jxjt,nj",  > O,n$ I 0)
d E(y$Ixjt,n$ > O,n,"tt  > 0)
f .E(yJytIxjt,  n$ 5 O,n$$  > 0)
g E(yJ$"  IxjtT  n$ > 0, nzt > 0)
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Comparing (b) , (c) and (d) g ives information to what extent $it  is indepen-
dent of E$ and $. We see fcom  Tables 13-15 that in specification (d), the effect
of the low employment year 1993 on the education level of the inflow is somewhat
more negative then for specifications (b) and (c) at job levels 1 and 2 while for job
level 3 it is slightly more positive. Comparing (e), (f) and (g) gives information
to what extent $i  is independent of ~~~ and $yt.  From the same tables we see
that for job levels 1 and 3, the coefficient of the 1993 dummy is positive or less
negative for specification (g) while for job level 2 it is more negative. Finally,
comparison of (b-e) with (a) , (c-f) with (a) and (d-g) with (a) gives us informa-
tion on the dependence of (E$ +gt)  and (Y$,  ~~7~).  For job levels 2 and 3 we are
likely to overestimate the upgrading effect in 1993 by restricting the analysis to
firms for which we observe both in- and outflow at given job complexity levels
while for job level 1 we are likely to underestimate the upgrading effect in 1993.
An alternative way to test and correct for some of the sample selection bias
is to estimate the in- and outflow equations with Heckman’s (1979) two-step
estimation procedure. The coefficient estimates of the inverse Mill ratio, ,/3E  and
@$” gives us information on the selectivity bias.i3 Tables 16 and 17 show that
those coefficient estimates for the selection terms are significant for job levels 1:
3 and 5 of the inflow equations and insignificant for all job levels of the outflow
equation.
B AVO data
The AVO data were collected by the Dutch “Labor inspection” (AI) which is
part of the department of Social Affairs and contains administrative data from
workers employed in both the private and the public sector. For our analysis we
only used workers who were employed in the private sector. Below we give a more
detailed description on the construction of some of the key variables.
Job complexity levels
Simple
fl Very simple activities which do not change over time. No schooling is neces-
sary and only limited experience. The activities are under direct supervi-
sion.
I2 Simple activities which are in general repeating. Some (lower) administrative
or technical knowledge and experience is required. In general the activities
take place under direct supervision.
131n  the probits  with n$  and n;it as dependent variables, we included the same exogenous
variables as  in the regressions of Table 9 since there are no obvious variables which affect the
years of schooling of the inBow  and the outflow  but do not influence the fact that we observe
either in or outflow, the identification of the Heckman model depends fully on the parametric
assumptions.
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Intermediate
f3 Less simple activities which do not repeat themselves continuously. Admin-
istrative or technical knowledge is required and the activities are partly
without direct supervision.
f4 More difficult (non-repeating) activities for which an intermediate level of
education is required. In general the activities take place without direct
supervision.
High
f5  Activities within a certain field which require a higher level of knowledge and
experience. The activities take place without direct supervision.
f6 Managing activities of an analytical, creative or contact nature: which are
undertaken independently and require an university or comparable level.
f7  Managers of intermediate companies or comparable plants, departments etc.
who also participate in decision making.
f8 Managers of large companies or comparable plants or departments.
In this paper we merged ff  and f8 and when reported f6-8 because of the
few observations in f8 and f7
Education
We have information on 7 types of schooling (total years, including the required
schooling to enter a particular type of education, between brackets):
Lower: primary, sl (6), junior general, s2  (10) and pre-vocational, s3  (10)
Intermediate: senior general, s4 (12) , senior vocational, s5  (14)
Higher vocational colleges, s6  (15) and university, s7  (16).
outflow
Workers not older than 60 years who left a firm because of (early) retirement,
disability, their test-period ended, layoff, displacement, they reported to have
found a new job or they were initially hired from a temporary employment office.
We do not observe movements between jobs within firms.
inflow
Workers who enter a new firm. Again, we do not observe within firm labour
flows.
tenure:
Measured in years (difference between starting and sampling date).
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w a g e
Monthly wages (including extra time payments, profits shares etc.) and hours
worked are measured very accurately. We calculated nominal gross hourly wages
for each worker and deflated the wage by the consumer price index to obtain real
wages.
wage agreement
We distinguish 3 types of wage contracts. Most workers have a collective wage
agreement (CAO) which is bargained over at the sectoral  level. The minister
of social affairs has the right to force all firms within a sector to pay the same
collectively bargained wage (AW) and finally there are workers who have a
bilateral bargained wage contract. Those workers are in general employed at
higher positions..
part- time /full-time
Part-time refers to working less than 100% of the regular number of hours
occupation
We have information on the following occupations : (1) simple technical activi-
ties, (2) administrative, (3) computer: (4) commercial, (5) service orient,ated,  (6)
creative. (7) management.
sector
Although the AVO data contain information on the public sector we restricted
our analysis to the private sector. We distinguish 12 sectors. (1) agriculture and
fishing, (2) food, (3) hc emical, (4) metal, (5) other industry, (6) construction
(7) trade, (8) hotels, restaurants catering, (9) transport: communication, (10)
banking and insurance, (11) other services, (12) health care
firm size
We have used the following size classes. (I) l-9 , (2) 10-19, (3) 20-49 (4), 50-99,
(5)100-199,  (6) 200-499, (7) 2 500 employees.
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C Tables
Table 1: Unemployment rates for different education classes
% Unemployed Share of labor force
primary 15 8
junior general 9 22
senior general, pre-vocational 6 44
vocational colleges 5 17
university 6 8
total 7
Note: Source: Statistics Netherlands,  EBB (1996)
100
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variable
Table 2: AVO data: weighted
workers employed at shrinking firm (%)
workers employed at growing firm (%)
male (%)
female (%)
infiow  (% of total employment)
outflow (% of total employment)
collective wage agreement (CAO, AW) ( %)
age (ye=4
completed education (years)
real gross hourly wage (Dutch guilders)
tenure (years)
firm size (1-19 employees)
firm size (20-49 employees)
firm size (50-99 employees)
firm size (loo-199  employees)
firm size (200-499 employees)
firms (>500 employees)
# workers
# firms
nleans  1993-96-
93
30.6
33.2
62.9
37.1
11.8
11.0
74.1
35.8
11.2
25.9
7.5
87.8
7.1
2.2
1.1
0.8
0.3
24053
1682
.
94
30.4
39.0
64.4
35.6
10.8
8.7
78.7
35.9
11.2
24.1
8.0
79.7
12.5
4.3
1.9
1.1
0.4
31250
1563-
95
24.6
44.8
62.3
37.7
13.4
9.6
77.0
36.0
11.3
26.7
7.5
80.8
11.4
4.4
1.7
1.0
0.5
26059
1375
-
T 9626.5
41.6
64.0
36.0
13.8
10.0
76.4
36.0
11.5
27.2
7.8
81.0
11.1
3.3
1.6
1.1
0.7
36380
1548
Il-
Vote: Individual records are weighted by individual*firm  weights: firm records are weighted
by firm weights
No rs.
Differences between samples are partly due to the fact that we do not observe promotions
within firms.
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N o r s .
Differences between samples are partly due to the fact that we do not observe formal training
between 2 sample periods.
Table 5: Labor market
Indicator
unemployment change %
employment change (%, EBB)
persons
man year
new vacancies xl000
filled vacancies xl000
employment xl000
Q
T
i
onditions: 1993-96
93 I 94 I 95
22.7 15.4 -6.7
-0.1 0.4 2.1l-----r-0.5 -0.3 2.1383 438 526396 428 5085754 5778 5897
-
96
-6.6
2.1
1.7
571
561
6016
Kate:  Source Statistics Netherlands. EBB is the Dutch Labor force stuc r;
Table 6: V/U ratio’s for a high and a low employment year
v/u 93 95 96_ 93/95 93/96
primary 0.002 0.030 0.040 0.067 0.050
i
junior general 0.169 0.038 0.038 4.445 4.445
pre vocational 0.068 0.133 0.133 0.511 0.511
senior general 0.025 0.075 0.052 0.328 0.481
senior vocational 0.076 0.172 0.156 0.574 0.487
vocational colleges 0.099 0.194 0.217 0.510 0.456
university 0.035 0.075 0.126 0.467 0.278
Xote:  Source $ tatistics  Netherlands
2 4
Table 7: Allocation of workers over jobs 1993-96 (in %)
job level 1 w-2 f3,f4 f5-f8
education 93 94 95 96 93 94 95 96 93 94 95 96
lower 93.1 92.7 91.8 90.1 63.0 61.5 58.7 58.4 6.5 4.8 3.4 3.5
intermediate 6.5 6.9 7.2 8.9 32.8 33.1 34.9 34.8 28.4 25.7 21.3 22.9
higher 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 4.2 5.5 6.4 6.8 65.1 69.5 75.3 73.7 J
Table 8: Outflow by education and job complexity level (in %)
education 1 job complexity level
sl-s3  s4,s5 s6,s7  fl,f2  f3,f4  f5-f8
layoff
93 8.3 7.2 7.7 10.4 7.4 6.2
94 2.6 1.4 1.2 2.8 2.0 1.3 ’
95 2.1 1.5 2.1 2.8 1.7 1.4
96 2.4 1.4 1.0 2.5 1.8 0.73
! to other job
/ 93 1.5 0.9 0.8 2.4 1.0 0.5
94 4.4 3.9 4.2 5.4 3.9 3.7
95 5.8 5.1 6.0 7.1 5.2 6.8
96 5.8 6.0 6.3 6.5 5.9 5.4
total outflow
93 12.7 10.2 10.5 16.2 10.8 8.4
94 10.4 7.6 7.7 13.1 8.3 7.6
95 11.3 9.0 10.0 14.7 9.4 9.3
96 11.4 9.7 9.4 14.2 10.0 8.2
Table 9: Coefficient estimates of WLS with (z& - yzt)  as dependent variable
r
job complexity level fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6-8  a l l
N 218 928 1931 810 349 113 4349
RS 9’:
-
$$’ mean 0.18 17.7 0 . 2 5  0 . 0 3 0.32 0.02 0.52 0.04 0.31 0.15 0.24 0.46 0.32 0.01 \
ok -0.20 -0.36 0.64 1.08 -0.12 ( 1.18 0.37
s.e 0.81 0.27 0.18 1.11 2.61 j 0.35 0.14
Note: Including sector, firm size and year dummies. Only for f2  a significant positive effect
was found for the low employment year dummy 1993 (0.31, s.e. 0.15, relative to 1996).
Unweighted estimates gave qualitatively similar results. Coefficient estimates which are
significant on the 95 % level are printed in bold. We could not reject the hypothesis that the
1993 dummy was zero in all equations, (F[6,4319] = 1.17)
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Table 10: Coefficient estimates of WLS with outflow dummies and yg;t:  as depen-
dent variable
Xote:  WI-S  estimates. Coefficients which are significant on the %  level are printed in bold.
Including sector and firm size dummies. The F-test is on the joint significance of @’  and (iFt
26
Table 11: Coefficient estimates of WLS with inflow dummies and $‘zt  as depen-
dent variable
job complexity level fl f-2 f3 f4 f5 f6-8 all
N 357 1432 2705 1405 721 299 6943
yJyt  mean 8.44 9.46 10.47 12.96 14.38 15.22 11.36 '
R2 0.17 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.36 0.12
 out
4
9 . 6 4 9 . 8 6 9.91 12.56 / 14.11 16.84 10.25 1
s .e (0.72) (0.25) (0.14) (0.42) (0.97) (1.11) (0.15) j
1993 -1.25 -0.14 -0.54 -0.28
s.e. (0.37) (0.15) ,K) (0.13) / (0.15) ;o"::; 7Ab"8',
1994 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 -0.48
s.e (0.36) (0.17) (0.09) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (0.09)
1995 -0.08 -0.17 0.32 0.03 0.15 0.20 -0.12
s.e. (0.37) (0.17) (0.08) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.08)
in 0.86 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.14 -0.40 -0.03
s.e. (0.46) (0.28) (0.17) (0.27) (0.32) (0.38) (0.16)
in93 -0.33 -0.14 0.39 -0.11 0.08 -0.87 0.04
s-e. (0.82) (0.35) (0.23) (0.41) (0.51) (0.51) (0.22)
in94 -1.67 -0.14 0.08 -0.72 -0.03 0.65 0.18
s.e. (0.70) (0.40) (0.27) (0.45) (0.53) (0.50) (0.25)
in95 -0.24 -0.06 -0.62 -0.07 -0.91 -0.39 0.17
s.e. (0.87) (0.45) (0.28) ~ (0.40) (0.60) (0.89) (0.26)
F(+-k) 1.62 1.82 6.10_ 11.42 0.59 4.34 0.41
Note: WLS estimates. Coefficients which are significant on the % level are printed in bold.
Including sector and firm size dummies. The F-test is on the joint significance of $p  and <g
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Table 12: Coefficient estimates of WLS regression with zz’jk as dependent variable
(for the inflow only) variable
job complexity level fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6-8 all
N 1061 3663 7283 2734 1243 375 16359
zijk mean -0.08 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.27 -0.13
R2 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.19
Qk -8.26 -11.29 -12.20 -6.71 -9.81 4.70 -6.99
s.e (0.61) (0.43) (0.32) (0.82) (1.62) (4.28) (0.21)
sijk - 0 . 0 0 -0.006 0.005 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00
s.e. (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.06) (0.001)
1993 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.03
s.e. (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.013) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
1994 -0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.11 0.02
s.e (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01)
1995 -0.04 -0.02 j -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.03
s.e. (0.02) (0.01) : (0.01) (0.012) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
log age 4.72 6.51 6.80 3.54 5.00 -2.99 3.76
s.e. (0.36) (0.24) (0.19) (0.47) (0.91) (2.42) (0.13)
(1%  “g42 -0.66 -0.92 -0.94 -0.46 -0.63 0.48 -0.51
s.e. (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 0.07 0.13 (0.34) (0.02)
female -0.01 -0.01 -0.013 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.003
s-e. (0.01) (0.01) (0.006) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) / (0.004)
yrs schooling (no firm effects) 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.09 0.05
s.e. (0.004) (0.002) 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.032 0.001
Note: zTjk is the difference between the real gross hourly wage of individual i at job
complexity level level k  at firm j and the average real gross wage at job level k  at firm j, sijk
is equal to the difference between the amount of schooling (in years) of individual i at job
complexity level k at firm j and the average amount of schooling (in years) at job level k at
firm j. Including industry, size, firm shrink and grow, CAO, AW and part time dummies.
Age is measured in years. The last two rows refer to estimates without fixed firm effects (log
hourly wage was the dependent variable). CA0  refers to a collective wage agreement and
AW refers to a sector binded (by the minister) wage agreement. For the pooled regression,
the coefficient estimate of CA0  was 0.02 (0.005) and for AW it was 0.03 (0.008),  for
shrinking firms it was 0.01 2 (0.006) and for growing firms it was 0.02 (0.005). Reference
states are ’ year 1996’,  ‘firms which did not change size, ‘bilateral wage agreement’, ‘male’.
Coefficient estimates which are significant on the 95 % level are printed in bold. The F
statistic for the hypothesis that sijl = sij2 = . = sij6 = 0, is equal to F[5,16289]  = 3.25
2 8
level 2
Table 15: Estimates on different sub samples for job complexit,
specification
b C d e
10.94 11.26 11.44 9.95
(0.15) (0.15) (0.30) (0.14)
0.01 0.02 0.29 0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.07)
-0.02 -0.07 0.29 -0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.08)
-0.08 -0.11 0.24 0.26
(0.09) 1 (0.09) 1 (0.16) 1 (0.08) 1
Note: The specifications refer to the ones In XI
(0.08) 1 (0.14). I.
level 3
2 9
Table 16: Coefficient estimates of WLS with Heckman  correction and y$ as
dependent variable
job complexity level fl i-2  f3  f4 f5 f6-8 all
P
crz 9.24 9.40 10.81 14.37 15.22 15.35 10.56
s .e (0.56) (0.21) (0.15) (0.39) (0.46) (0.22) (0.14)
1993 -0.65 0.07 0.02 -0.34 -0.08 0.17 -0.28
s.e. (0.28) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07)
1994 -0.13 0.38 -0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.02 -0.27
s.e (0.27) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.16) (0.08)
1995 -0.22 0.13 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.42 -0.20
s.e. (0.26) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07)
Xk zn 0.30 0.12 0.25 0.03 -0.18 -1.03 0.02
s.e (0.15) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.53) (0.03)
Note: 2-step Hecman selection estimates. Coefficient estimates which are significant on the 95
% level are printed in bold. Including sector and firm size dummies. Identification depends on
parametric assumptions only.
Table 17: Coefficient estimates of WLS with Heckman  correction and $‘zt as
dependent variable
r job complexity level fl i-2  f3 f4 f5 f6-8 all
out
ajk 10.46 10.14 10.06 12.62 14.23 16.88 10.25
s .e (0.76) (0.26) (0.14) (0.43) (0.98) (1.15) (0.16)
1993 -1.34 -0.15 0.01 -0.55 -0.25 -0.40 -0.41
s.e. (0.33) (0.14) (0.07) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.07)
1994 -0.46 -0.00 -0.03 -0.24 -0.16 -0.07 -0.46
s.e (0.32) (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.08)
1995 -0.21 -0.19 0.26 0.04 0.08 0.18 -0.14
s.e. (0.34) (0.16) (0.08) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.08)
 Lnlt -0.25 -0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.10 0.06 -0.11
s .e (0.14) (0.07) (0.04) (0.60) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) i
Note: 2-step Hecman selection estimates. Coefficient estimates which are significant on the 95
% level are printed in bold. Including sector and firm size dummies. Identification depends on
parametric assumptions only.
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Table 18: Allocation of workers over iobs 1993
job complexity level yr fl f2 f3 f4 * f5 f6 f7,8 % of total
education 93
primary 51.7 23.9 4.1 1 . 0 0.4 0.3 0.0 7.4
junior general 15.4 28.7 15.1 4.7 2.7 2.2 0.8 13.3
pre-vocational 29.1 39.9 60.7 19.7 3.7 4.0 3.0 39.9
senior general 2.2 4.7 8.0 15.8 7.2 4.4 1.6 8.7
senior vocational 1.1 2.5 11.4 46.7 25.5 15.7 2.7 18.6
vocational colleges 0.5 0.3 0.6 11.3 53.3 34.1 37.2 9.5
university 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 7.3 39.4 54.7 2.7
% of total 2.8 15.7 46.3 20.8 10.0 3.8 0.5 100
Table 19: Allocation of workers over iobs 1994
job complexity level yr fl f2 f3 f4 / f5 f6 f7,8 % of total
1education 94
primary 43.6 16.9 3.7 0.8 0.2 0.0 1.5 6.8
junior general 28.5 27.7 12.6 3.9 1.5 0.5 0.6 12.8
pre-vocational 24.0 47.0 61.9 18.9 4.4 0.6 0.0 42.2
senior general 2.3 4.6 7.8 11.5 4.8 2.1 2.4 7.4
’senior vocational 1.6 3.2 12.8 49.9 25.7 9.2 2.9 19.3
vocational colleges 0.0 0.4 1.2 14.1 54.2 35.6 36.6 9.1
university 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.8 9.3 52.1 55.6 2.5
% of total 5.0 16.3 46.9 20.7 8.4 2.5 0.2 100
Table 20: Allocation of workers over jobs 1995
job complexity level yr fl f2  f3 f4 f5 f6 f7,8 % of total
education 95
primary 48.1 22.8 4.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 7.9
junior general 22.0 28.5 15.8 3.9 1.3 0.5 0.0 13.6
pre-vocational 24.2 39.6 56.4 14.5 2.8 0.8 0.0 36.9
senior general 2.8 5.1 8.2 12.7 5.6 1.4 1.0 8.0
senior vocational 1.9 3.1 13.6 51.4 21.6 3.0 1.5 19.9
vocational colleges 1.0 0.6 1.4 15.9 60.9 25.4 16.4 10.5
university 0.0 0.4 0.2 1.2 7.7 68.9 81.1 3.3
% of total 5.2 14.1 47.3 21.2 9.0 2.9 0.2 100
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Table 21: Allocation of workers over iobs 1996
J--- ----
job complexity level yr fl f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7,8  % of total
education 96
primary 47.3 22.7 3.7 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 6.1
junior general 21.7 ’ 27.2 20.4 4.2 1.4 0.2 0.0 14.5
pre-vocational 23.9 39.4 54.5 13.8 2.4 1.2 0.0 34.4
senior general 4.5 6.5 7.5 16.3 4.7 2.0 1.2 8.9
senior vocational 1.4 3.4 12.3 48.0 21.5 8.1 1.6 20.4
vocational colleges 1.0 0.6 1.4 15.2 58.7 38.0 42.3 12.4
universi t-y 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.9 11.2 50.5 55.0 3.4
8 I I I I I I 1
/ 1
I
% of total 3.5 10.9 147.1 / 23.9 1 11.7 12.8 10.1 / 100.0
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